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THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN 
CIVIC SPHERE 
THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC VISIONS AND 
STRUGGLES IN THE PATH TOWARD 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. By Elizabeth 
Beaumont.1 Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. xvi + 343. 
$49.95. 
PEOPLING THE CONSTITUTION. John E. Finn.2 
University Press of Kansas, 2014. Pp. xv + 350. $39.95. 
Mariah Zeisberg3 
Do citizens alter, transform, remake, and authorize their fun-
damental law only outside of a particular regime, or from within 
it as well? What forms of political agency have citizens in the U.S. 
constitutional polity used in the past to achieve these ends, and 
which offer themselves today? What is the role of radical critique 
and radical action in the development of certain hegemonic bina-
ries like “public” and “private,” “free” and “slave,” the “social” 
and the “political”? Beyond winning electoral victories or suing 
for their rights, how else can and do movements transform politi-
cal structures, ideas, and outcomes in the U.S.? 
In a polity whose foundational referent is a text—the U.S. 
Constitution—these questions about public mobilization and po-
litical life are also questions about the links between civic life and 
the ongoing authority of a constitutional project. Civic life is so 
important because, in John Finn’s words, the “main principles of 
constitutional architecture, such as the principle of checks and 
balances, [are] mere parchment barriers but for their grounding 
in a civic culture that regards them as valuable and insists upon 
some measure of fidelity to them by political actors and citizens” 
(p. 85). Both of these works—The Civic Constitution and Peopling 
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the Constitution—interrogate the civic conditions that rest behind 
the ongoing authority of a constitutional order. 
The contribution of both works should be understood from 
within a paradigm set by two field-defining theoretic propositions: 
Bruce Ackerman’s notion of constitutional dualism and Larry 
Kramer’s constitutional populism.4 Bruce Ackerman’s idea of 
constitutional “dualism” describes constitutional authority as a 
creation of citizens who use legal tools—most especially voting, 
petitioning, and assembling—to periodically influence elite repre-
sentatives to transform the Constitution’s practical meaning. 5 For 
Kramer, constitutional publics have, in an ongoing way—as vot-
ers, jurors, mobs, legislatures, and town halls—been able to mo-
bilize to seize authority over constitutional meaning and espe-
cially to seize it away from judges. 6 Both of these approaches are 
useful, but both have limits. Many have challenged the periodicity 
of Ackerman’s account, as well as the implication that, in John 
Finn’s words, “[i]n most moments . . . citizens have little obligation 
to tend to the Constitution or even to public life” (p. 99). Kramer’s 
work obscures the organizational features of the public’s collec-
tive action because Kramer never defines who “the people” are, 
how they may be recognized, or the processes and structures 
through which they exercise political agency. 
Beaumont and Finn have written substantial books that 
begin to address these problems. For Finn, citizens make the Con-
stitution authoritative by using its text in their deliberations; rea-
soning about the public good; tending to civic life; arguing and re-
sisting; and voting and petitioning too. Finn’s ideal constitutional 
citizens are highly mobilized, highly educated extraverts, not con-
tent to register their preferences in a voting booth or sue for their 
rights, but instead demanding that the public spaces around them 
engage constitutionalist values almost relentlessly. His key cate-
gory is “tending”: citizens tend to a constitutional order when they 
are committed in an active, ongoing way centered on everyday 
“practices of care” which are grounded in “a specific kind of 
knowledge, one grounded in the practice of politics and practical 
experience” (p. 26). For Beaumont, practices of civic deliberation 
themselves create citizens. In The Civic Constitution, deliberation 
is the work that unauthorized subjects (colonists, women, slaves) 
 4. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993); LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2004). 
 5. ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 10–16. 
 6. KRAMER, supra note 4, at 208–13.  
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do to transform themselves into recognized constitutional agents. 
Beaumont calls this a power of “civic founding” (pp. 5–8). Argu-
ing that the Constitution contains no “self-correcting” mechanism 
(p. 22), Beaumont shows that scholars seeking to understand the 
ongoing meaning of constitutional text over time should study the 
citizens whose ideas and actions have transformed public mean-
ings of the text and the structures and the forms of agency through 
which citizens have claimed and exercised this civic power (pp. 11, 
14). Their practices of self-authorization led them to speak in con-
texts that they were barred from, to sit in areas of exclusion, to 
use bazaars, fairs, newspaper publications, petitions and assem-
blies, and most essentially peaceful confrontation to argue for and 
perform their visions of politics to others. From her discussions of 
the use of free speech by “common men” (p. 31), to her exposure 
of the early uses of boycotts and non-importation agreements for 
revolutionary politics (p. 53), her excavation of “debtors’ consti-
tutionalism” (p. 77) and the radical practice of suffragists (chapter 
5), Beaumont brings attention to how citizen advocates have been 
driven to “self-authoriz[e]” themselves (p. 150) to address prob-
lems that their fellows were only too ready to suppress. 
For both authors, this “founding” or “tending” can happen 
almost anywhere: pie-baking circles and the PTA, workplaces and 
jury boxes, as well as “letters to the editor, farmers’ markets, cof-
fee houses, barbershops, supermarkets, and a nearly endless vari-
ety of so-called third spaces” (Finn, p. 14). When citizens use con-
stitutional language, institutions, and values for advocacy, 
contestation, and deliberation, then according to these authors, 
they are sustaining constitutional authority. 
The works have a number of important similarities that will, 
I hope, become ordinary in this field. Both authors move past ac-
counts of political authority rooted in ideological, cultural, or rea-
soned unanimity. They instead are careful to insist that the Con-
stitution can be authoritative even when, or perhaps especially 
when, its meaning and even value are contested. Indeed contesta-
tion is one of the major processes through which a constitution 
becomes relevant in public life. For Finn, a faithful civic constitu-
tional practice involves being willing to expose disagreement and 
pluralism as well as reasoned responsiveness in a context of con-
flict. In The Civic Constitution, Beaumont explores instances of 
civic founding in which a minority (sometimes a very tiny minority 
indeed) was able, through dedicated advocacy, to challenge ma-
jority conceptions of constitutional meaning and ultimately pre-
vail. Neither scholar sees unanimity as an especially important 
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category for understanding public authority. I would have en-
joyed reading more about how each scholar relates this patient 
attitude towards conflict to the highly-developed conceptions of 
political authority that are currently pervasive, almost all of which 
identify consensus (either ideological consensus or consensus in 
terms of being willing to submit to certain practices of reason-giv-
ing) as a foundation for political authority. 
Both scholars also embrace, rather than resist, the tension be-
tween empirical and evaluative work at the heart of constitutional 
studies. The citizens they study are ones who are self-consciously 
disciplining themselves with constitutional language and values 
(Beaumont’s civic founders are sophisticated constitutional 
agents who are not simply bending constitutional language to 
their own preferences but rather self-police with an explicit eye 
towards the “constitutional mode” (p. 58)). At the same time, 
these scholars are not exploring empirical social movements that 
engage the Constitution’s text so much as worthwhile political 
practices. While relatively positivist inquiry has its place in social 
science, the aspiration towards value-neutrality also often may 
obscure the straightforward (and frequently defensible) value 
judgments behind scholarly research. These authors are refresh-
ingly forthright about the value judgments resting behind the 
scope of their inquiry. In Beaumont’s words, “[n]otions of found-
ing and refounding are not purely historical, factual, or empirical 
designations; they are interpretive or hermeneutic frameworks 
that involve attempts to understand and explain the origins and 
foundational values of our modern political community” (Beau-
mont, pp. 217–18). For Finn, “[e]very constitution rests upon . . . 
a boundary between the spheres of public and private life, or be-
tween state and society. These categories are not just empirical 
political facts . . . They are themselves objects of constitutional de-
sign,” and as such, subject to ongoing evaluation (p. 85). Both as-
sert that, as a point of historical fact, citizens have launched polit-
ical projects in the Constitution’s name—creating Jim Crow or 
resisting women’s equality, for example—that the best scholarly 
accounts of constitutional “tending” or “founding” should either 
marginalize or outright ignore (e.g., Beaumont, p. 233; Finn, p. 
165). Beaumont explicitly rejects treating movements for racial 
hierarchy as “foundational” because, while they have obviously 
been important, they did not help to found the “type of political 
community we are and should be” (p. 224). At the same time, the 
emphasis on understanding authorization practices and not just 
 
MARIAH ZEISBERG FINN REVIEW 2_DRAFT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:05 PM 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 75 
ideas means that each author is willing to defend forms of engage-
ment that often leave something to be desired (as when Beaumont 
cautiously traces the tensions between women suffragists and abo-
litionists in the context of Reconstruction Politics) (ch. 4). This is 
an important departure from Kramer and Ackerman’s value-neu-
tral or proceduralist conceptions of public authority. 
The question at stake is whether highly mobilized citizens can 
be “wrong” about what the Constitution means, whether their 
moments of seizing public power should always be described in 
terms of tending or founding, and if not, what distinguishes sub-
versive political action from sustaining political action. This is es-
pecially important insofar as conflict is itself part of the project of 
constitutional maintenance. The moderation which Beaumont, 
especially, demonstrates in her selection criteria is consistent with 
Rogers Smith’s appeal for scholars and citizens to self-consciously 
center, in their research and advocacy, inclusive versions of the 
many American civic traditions.7 
The two works have important differences. While Beaumont 
explores key moments of refounding, Finn resists periodicity. For 
Finn, constitutional authority derives not from key moments but 
more pervasively from a “way of life” that involves citizens’ be-
liefs, aspirations, and importantly, practices (pp. 4, 6, 13, 175). 
Finn sketches a portrait of a deliberative, active and engaged citi-
zenry and admits that the burdens of this form of citizenship are 
“weighty” (p. 97), for “the Civic Constitution seeks an active 
transformation of persons into citizens,” with no “sharp, impreg-
nable distinction” between the public and private, refusing that 
liberal “liberty to be bad” (p. 97). In a series of careful essays Finn 
spells out the relationship between civic constitutionalism and de-
liberation, justice, and “civility,” and then interrogates how a pub-
lic can create, maintain, or destroy a constitutional polity. I found 
civility to be one of his most interesting concepts. Finn emphasizes 
that to be “civil” is not the same as to behave democratically, be-
cause “civility” includes the limitations on political life that are 
part of “bonds of fellowship” and “constraints upon the democ-
racy authority” (p. 158). Civility involves a willingness to take up 
the burdens of a constitutionalist politics that is explicitly con-
cerned with ends and outcomes (Finn references Sotirios Barber’s 
work on constitutional welfarism8 in this context (p. 168)). Any 
 7. ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF 
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP (2003). 
 8. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).  
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differences between cultural tendencies in a democratic or consti-
tutionalist polity obviously depend on how one defines these 
terms in the first place, and I had some disagreement with Finn’s 
understanding of democracy as majoritarianism, but in his hands 
the concept of “civility” is recurrently helpful, especially in his 
willingness to characterize dissident, rule-breaking, or unman-
nerly behavior as “civil” if it nevertheless seeks cultural account-
ability to constitutional commitments (p. 185). 
Running throughout Peopling the Constitution is an ongoing 
contrast between the Civic Constitution and the Juridical one, and 
here I disagreed with the author. The “Juridical Constitution” is, 
for Finn, associated with private liberal individualism (p. 80), with 
Constitution “worship” (p. 116), with judicial supremacy (p. 133), 
with constitutional settlement rather than dialogue (p. 133), and 
in general with an atrophy of public debate (p. 133). Finn 
acknowledges that the Juridical Constitution is equally rooted in 
the Constitution’s text (p. 88), but rejects Juridical constitutional-
ism because the responsibilities it delineates for citizens are 
“sharply limited—paying taxes, reporting for jury service, and 
voting”—such that “citizenship is an occasional, part-time prac-
tice,” and an exercise of power always only mediated by represen-
tation (p. 96). He worries that the public’s felt responsibility for 
constitutional deliberation might be merely “ceremonious” (p. 
157) if publics imagine that deliberation is only the Court’s 
work—a phenomenon Mark Tushnet names judicial "overhang" 
(p. 133). 
Analytically this seems to me not quite right. The boldest 
statements of judicial supremacy—Cooper v. Aaron,9 Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,10 City of Boerne v. Flores11—involve a Court 
struggling to make itself heard in a thicket of political opposition. 
It is hard to claim that the Court’s statements of supremacy in 
these cases were politically decisive. If these cases represent the 
Court’s preferred outcome, then it is worth noticing that in no 
area has that outcome actually prevailed (desegregated schools, 
reasonable and pervasive access to abortion rights, or the immun-
ity of generally applicable federal legislation to special challenge 
by religious groups)—to say nothing of being “settled.” Are the 
Court’s cries of supremacy really the last word or are they the 
shout of a political institution that believes it is losing its grip? 
 9. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 11. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).   
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Consider that Louis Seidman, a legal theorist of unsettlement, cel-
ebrates strong statements of judicial authority precisely for the 
backlash that they can create.12 
One might also respond that most citizens easily shrug off 
weighty constitutional responsibilities with a much easier excuse 
than judicial overhang. Most citizens, even very active ones, have 
so many other valuable things to do. Raising families, earning a 
wage, playing sports, creating community, appreciating the sa-
cred, and being sociable can be wonderful activities even if not 
disciplined by the project of maintaining a particular constitu-
tional order. Where does this fit into Finn’s demanding republi-
canism? Are citizens who would rather pursue hobbies, make art, 
work hard, invest money, and raise children forever destined to 
be governed by predators? Finn offers little confidence that al-
most any of this work can be safely delegated to representatives 
or to legal professionals and I wonder if, given the centrality of 
representation and legal structures to the constitutional text, Finn 
hasn’t painted a portrait of a Constitution at war with itself (p. 
169). 
The next question that both works raise for me is about the 
structure of the public spheres that have transformed constitu-
tional meaning. I think each author has made a serious contribu-
tion here and I hope other scholars will take up the agenda that 
these books set. Beaumont is clear that she is studying how a dis-
ciplined, structured associational life has enabled subjects to claim 
power and create textual meaning that includes them in the bur-
dens and privileges of governing (pp. 11, 14). She is persuasive 
that subjects have had to creatively re-imagine social and political 
structures to re-found an order that will generate outcomes inclu-
sive of them. At the same time, in a social movement, not every 
citizen participates in the same way (p. 152). And, while constitu-
tional language may prompt the formation of responsive public 
constituencies, some language has been less generative than other 
language. Consider the difference between mobilization around 
the Second Amendment and mobilization around the guarantee 
of a “republican form of government” for the states (p. 208). If 
“the public” (p. 41) really is a diverse and disciplined array of as-
sociations rather than a mass—then what is the relationship be-
tween the structure of that sphere, and constitutional outcomes? 
Can we note any general tendencies or systematic relationships? 
 12.  LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW 
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 144–216 (2001).  
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Vast literatures in law and political science interrogate the sys-
tematic relationships between the membership, behavior, and 
rules of institutions to the outcomes they generate. If the public is 
more like an institution than a mass, then constitutional scholars 
should interrogate its characteristic features and behavior as we 
do for other institutions. 
I would be especially interested to learn more about the ef-
fects of class and economic hierarchy on the structure of the pub-
lic sphere and on constitutional outcomes. In fact, on the basis of 
Beaumont’s work (which highlights the incredibly high burdens 
placed on would-be constitutional founders) and from Finn’s de-
manding republicanism, the books lead me to wonder whether the 
very notion of civic constitutionalism might be at odds with the 
constitutional text insofar as that text entrenches an elitist com-
mercial republic. 
The political effects of class hierarchy are vast. And class hi-
erarchy may well be grounded in the Constitution itself: Stephen 
Elkin’s work on the “commercial republic” make it clear that the 
Constitution’s commitment to the blessings of liberty, free trade, 
and a national legislature empowered to enable commerce will 
generate some kind of economic elite.13 These values are rein-
forced by a complex, highly mediated representational structure 
that privileges the wealthy in terms of influence, access, and of-
fice-holding.14 This complex system filters out many potentially 
successful political movements, but arguably has its strongest ef-
fect on class politics. A constitutional commitment to generating 
wealth without a corresponding textual concern for wealth distri-
bution generates pressing problems of inclusion. Neither Beau-
mont nor Finn interrogates the expectation of some of the framers 
that the Constitution will generate an economic elite which would 
then disproportionately hold the reigns of social and political 
power. Neither work interrogates the way constitutional struc-
tures generate hierarchy or the relative impermeability of consti-
tutional institutions to class-based politics. Finn even transforms 
Madison’s class anxiety (the famous logic of demobilization in the 
Federalist Papers) into an anxiety about judicial supremacy (p. 
73). In general, I found myself wanting to hear more details about 
 13. STEPHEN L. ELKIN, RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AFTER MADISON 19–73 (2006).  
 14. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008).  
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the structure of the public spheres that, according to these au-
thors, hold so much constitutional authority and in particular I 
wanted to hear about economic hierarchy within that structure. 
Reading these two books together also raises some interest-
ing questions about intellectual or ideological divisions of labor in 
public mobilizations. Beaumont is clear that in a social movement, 
many citizens will participate, but not every citizen participates in 
the same way. When assessing the constitutional authority of a 
movement, she turns to its most highly developed constitutional 
articulations, not to whether each individual within that move-
ment could offer a cogent, rational, developed justification for 
their politics. This is in sharp contrast to Finn’s account of civic 
authority, which seems to demand that, to make a real contribu-
tion to constitutional culture, a movement must be constituted en-
tirely of individuals who are not only active and present, but also 
each and every one of them familiar with the precise constitu-
tional vocabularies that are a part of the movements they support. 
In general, for Finn, representation and delegation (either from 
publics to institutions, or from one public to other publics) appear 
as dead-end streets. I find Beaumont’s approach more appropri-
ately political. Isn’t there room in an “ideal” movement for folks 
to help bake pies, walk door-to-door, or circulate newspapers 
without needing to think through the precise ins-and-outs of, say, 
the extent to which the Fugitive Persons Clause mandates na-
tional rather than state authority over the meaning of due pro-
cess? Is it enough for some, indeed many participants to know, to 
feel, that slavery is wrong and to want to do something about it, 
without concerning themselves too much about the extent of ex-
ecutive power in the states? Should scholars really claim that the 
abolitionist movement—which pulled off perhaps the single most 
successful constitutional transformation, by any terms, of any 
movement – was less than ideal if not every participant had 
thought through the Lysander Spooner—Frederick Douglass—
William Lloyd Garrison—John Brown debate? The civic found-
ers and tenders of our nation’s history haven’t necessarily all been 
participants in all of the many diverse forms of labor demanded 
by their movements. To the extent that there is division of labor, 
and to the extent that that division is acceptable, I wonder about 
its terms. To what extent did these movements feature separation 
between their material work—baking pies, printing newspapers, 
and the like—and the ideological labor of developing arguments, 
generating new ideas and new language? How did economic class 
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and gender structure these divisions? How deeply did constitu-
tional language and ideation saturate the discourse of these move-
ments? 
 
 
